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Abstract  
Poor working conditions in global supply chains have led to private initiatives that seek to 
regulate labor practices in developing countries. But how effective are these regulatory programs? 
We investigate the effects of transnational private regulation by studying Hewlett-Packard's (HP) 
supplier responsibility program. Using analysis of factory audits, interviews with buyer and 
supplier management, and field research at production facilities across seven countries, we find 
that national context – not repeated audits, capability building, or supply chain power – is the key 
predictor of workplace compliance. Quantitative analysis shows that factories in China are 
markedly less compliant than those in countries with stronger civil society and regulatory 
institutions. Comparative field research then illustrates how these local institutions complement 
transnational private regulation. Although these findings imply limits to private regulation in 
institutionally poor settings, they also highlight opportunities for productive linkages between 
transnational actors and local state and society. 
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Introduction 
When Apple, the largest public corporation by market capitalization, joined the Fair Labor 
Association in 2012, it marked a turning point in efforts by global brands to distance themselves 
from the labor and environmental problems occurring in their supply chains. Whether willingly 
or under external pressure, global buyers in an array of industries have embraced a degree of 
responsibility for workplace conditions among their suppliers that was rare just a decade earlier.  
These public commitments, administered through systems of private, voluntary regulation, imply 
that private actors can somehow overcome or ameliorate the economic, social, legal, and political 
factors underlying poor working conditions persistent in the developing world. But do they? How 
effective are private voluntary initiatives at improving labor standards in these sites of global 
production?  
This paper offers new empirics and theory on how transnational private regulation shapes 
workplace outcomes in emerging markets.  Specifically, we argue that the local institutional 
context remains the key predictor of compliance even after adjusting for factory-level features 
held to be important from previous literature.  We establish the importance of local context 
empirically, ruling out common alternative explanations, using quantitative analysis of factory 
social audits across twelve countries.  We then use qualitative fieldwork to identify two 
institutional dimensions that complement private regulation.  The first is the strength of state 
regulatory institutions.  The threat of state-enforced penalties for illegal behavior creates 
incentive for factories to address problems identified by private auditors.  The second is the 
strength of local civil society.  Independent, worker-oriented organizations can cooperate with 
employers and global brands to improve standards.   
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This study offers new understanding of the complementarity between transnational private 
regulation and local institutions and the mechanisms through which these complementarities 
emerge.  Previous research suggests that private regulation need not crowd out public regulation 
(Bartley 2011, Locke 2013).  However, complementarities identified in previous research were 
either uncoordinated (Amengual 2010, Coslovsky and Locke 2013) or driven by public sector 
actors (Amengual 2014).  In contrast, we show how complementarity can arise from interaction 
between transnational private regulation and local institutions.  Moreoever, these synergies need 
not be state-driven; partnership between business and local civil society can bypass ineffective 
state institutions to raise standards. 
We arrive at these findings by studying the efforts of one of the world's largest electronics 
firms, Hewlett-Packard (HP), to regulate working conditions and labor rights in its global supply 
chain.  We first review the scholarly literature and theoretical debates concerning private 
regulation of global supply chains. We then describe the setting of our research: the global 
electronics industry and HP’s supply chain compliance program. This is followed by analysis of 
compliance and improvements using audits of HP supplier factories. We then examine whether 
the regional disparities we observe can be explained by factory-level characteristics, testing 
hypotheses from the literature on supply chain social responsibility. After rejecting factory-level 
explanations for this divergence, we offer case study evidence on the mechanisms through which 
domestic institutions interact with private regulation to enhance or undermine its efficacy.  We 
conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for effective transnational private 
regulation. 
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Private regulation of global supply chains 
The current era of globalization is characterized by fragmented ownership and the geographic 
dispersion of production. This economic transformation poses a new set of opportunities and 
challenges for emerging economies. Integration with global supply chains may bring new 
employment opportunities, technological spillover, or higher wages to local firms and their 
workers. Yet multiple sources document harsh working conditions and environmental 
degradation across a variety of global industries (Connor & Dent 2006; Verite 2004; 
GoodElectronics 2009; SwedWatch, SACOM & SOMO 2008; makeITfair 2009; Bormann & 
Plank 2010).  While many developing countries appear to possess strong regulations, in practice 
these states often lack the ability (Laffont & Tirole 1993; Baccaro 2001; Elliott & Freeman 2003; 
Estache & Wren-Lewis 2009) or willingness (Bhagwati 1995) to enforce their own laws.  
A lively debate has developed over whether, and under which conditions, labor and 
environmental standards can be enforced in an era of globalized production. One stream of 
research in international political economy focuses on how developing countries engage with 
global production, arguing that foreign direct investment raises labor standards while 
subcontracting relationships depress them (Mosley & Uno 2007; Mosley 2011).  Others argue 
that ethical production depends upon national legislation and state enforcement of these laws 
(Weil 1996; Reich 2007; Piore 2005; Schrank 2009). Still others see potential for consumer 
pressure to incentivize suppliers to compete for the best combination of ethical practice and price 
(Fung et al 2001; Moran 2002). Indeed, lead firms across many industries have developed private 
regulatory systems that set standards—often called “codes of conduct”—and monitor their supply 
chains for compliance to these codes (Locke 2013).   
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This study contributes to scholarship on the conditions under which private regulation 
stimulates improved compliance with social and environmental standards.  Formative work on 
private regulation examined codes of conduct within athletic footwear (Strasser & Becklund 1993; 
Rosenzweig 1994; Barrientos & Smith 2007; Locke, Qin & Brause 2007), apparel (Elliott & 
Freeman 2003; Esbenshade 2004; Bartley 1996; Weil 2005; Rodriguez-Garavito 2005; Barrientos 
& Smith 2007; Locke et al 2009; Ruwanpura and Wrigley 2011), and agriculture (Barrientos & 
Smith 2007; Riisgaard 2009, Coslovsky and Locke 2013). These studies of low-technology 
industries observed generally poor compliance with international labor and environmental 
standards and modest-to-no improvement as a result of private regulatory efforts. Recent 
scholarly inquiry has suggested that rather than voluntary private regulation functioning 
effectively in isolation, a mixture of systems involving public and private actors is key 
(Amengual 2010; Weil 2005; Locke, Kochan, Romis & Qin 2007; Locke, Qin & Brause 2007; 
Haufler 2001; Kolben 2007). In fact, it appears as if private compliance efforts are often “layered” 
upon more traditional forms of state regulation (Bartley 2011; Trubek & Trubek 2007) and that 
under certain circumstances, these two forms of regulation can either complement or undermine 
one another.   
We focus on the global electronics industry, a setting where one might expect higher degrees 
of compliance with labor standards and hence, improved working conditions. Many electronics 
suppliers are large multinational corporations, in some cases producing components that 
command high price premiums. Their varying sophistication and market position may create new 
dynamics of interaction with global buyers (Gereffi et al 2005). Furthermore, whereas nearly all 
lead firms in previous studies adopted supplier codes of conduct in response to consumer 
pressure or public scandal, our research subject (HP) anticipated these pressures and 
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preemptively developed internal and industry-wide strategies for regulating social conditions in 
the supply chain. One might therefore expect HP to show more promise for effective private 
regulation.  
Setting: Global Electronics Production and HP 
The electronics industry is one of the largest and fastest-growing manufacturing sectors, 
typified by production networks involving numerous suppliers across the globe and employing 
over 15 million worldwide (OECD, 2008).  In the late 1980s, leading firms transitioned away 
from vertically integrated production structures to a new model of outsourced manufacturing 
(Sturgeon 2002; Gereffi et al 2005). Their manufacturing facilities were typically sold to firms 
specializing in production, resulting in the rapid growth of electronics contract manufacturers 
such as Flextronics, Celestica, Sanmina, Jabil, and Hon Hai Foxconn (Barnes et al 2000; Luthje 
2002). Notwithstanding the huge volume of contract manufacturing business, profits remain 
highly concentrated in the lead firms involved in product definition, marketing, and retail. In 
2011, the five largest global brands in electronics reported almost three times the revenue but 
nearly thirty times the profit of the five largest contract manufacturers (Locke, Pal, and Rissing 
2013: 525). 
In response to volatile demand and cost pressures within the electronics supply chain, 
contract manufactures have adopted employment policies characterized by low wages, precarious 
or temporary work, and high reliance on migrant workers (Bormann & Plank 2010; makeITfair 
2009; CAFOD 2004; Smith et al 2006; Chan & Peyer 2008). These practices have contributed to 
poor working conditions, especially excessive work hours and health and safety violations (Smith 
et al 2006; Overeem 2009). These working conditions were highlighted by scandals in the 
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world’s largest electronics manufacturer, Foxconn, from a string of worker suicides (Pun & Chan 
2012) to deadly workplace explosions in 2011 due to poor industrial hygiene.i 
Hewlett Packard (HP) is one of the world's largest global electronics firms.ii In 2010, HP 
shipped over 64 million personal computers (PCs) for a global market share of 20%.iii This 
output requires an extensive supply chain. During fiscal year 2010, HP directly employed 
roughly 325,000 people across 170 countries and contracted with approximately 1,000 
production suppliers in over 1,200 locations worldwide (Hewlett Packard 2011).  Although it is 
difficult to estimate the precise number of workers employed in its supply base, HP reports that 
the 90 suppliers audited in 2010—less than 10% of all subcontracted firms—employed over 
260,000 workers (Hewlett Packard 2011). 
HP established a supply chain code of conduct in 2002, and went on to help establish the 
Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) with seven other firms in 2004.  During the 
period covered by this study, HP’s supply chain program combined compliance auditing, 
capability building, and collaboration with other stakeholders such as NGOs to improve working 
conditions among its suppliers. These efforts reflect the firm-level commitment that some 
consider critical to the success of non-governmental regulation (Mamic 2004).  
Factory Audit Data 
We gained access to HP’s supplier audit reports to study compliance with labor and 
environmental standards in factories across the world.  Use of internal audit reports introduces 
concerns of data validity, since audits are conducted largely by HP staff rather than independent 
auditors and represent temporally limited snapshots of factory practices.  Previous studies 
suggest that social auditing may suffer from shortcomings including superficial efforts by 
suppliers to “pass” auditor checklists and insufficient expertise in the myriad technical, cultural 
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and linguistic skills needed to evaluate workplace practices in different countries (O’Rourke 2002; 
Esbenshade 2004). This section summarizes HP’s auditing practices and discusses our efforts to 
ensure data validity in the analyses that follow. 
HP’s supplier audit is based on the EICC code and consists of 53 items.  These workplace 
standards are listed in Online Appendix Table A2, and more detailed descriptions are publicly 
available. iv  However, in certain cases the standards themselves require attention.  The 
“Freedom of Association” standard states: “The rights of workers to associate freely, join or not 
join labor unions, seek representation, and join workers’ councils, and bargain collectively in 
accordance with local laws shall be respected” (emphasis added).  As local law in countries like 
China greatly restricts these rights, facilities that are nominally compliant may not conform to the 
commonly understood definition of freedoom of association as endorsed by the International 
Labour Organization.  The content of the remaining standards is generally unexceptionable, 
addressing issues that include humane treatment, non-discimination, and a variety of workplace 
safety measures.  Violations of standards are marked as major or minor nonconformances.  We 
adopt a conservative measure of compliance in the following analyses; audit items are compliant 
only if auditors find neither major nor minor nonconformances. 
First-time audits usually take two days and make use of document reviews, manager 
interviews, worker interviews, and inspection of production facilities. Among facilities audited 
multiple times, they receive on average 1.5 audits per year. The auditors themselves are 
organized into regional teams and do not necessarily work on supplier responsibility full-time. 
They are largely members of HP’s Global Procurement Services division, based in regional 
offices around the world.   
9 
Production Goes Global, Compliance Stays Local 
 
 
Facilities at high risk of code violations were given first priority in auditing. The criteria for 
assigning risk include factory location, volume of production, amount and type of manual labor 
involved, and exposure to chemicals throughout the production process.v  These audit selection 
criteria mean that poor performers receive more frequent audits than highly compliant plants.  
Therefore, audit data are primarily informative about the subpopulation of suppliers at greatest 
risk for violations of labor and environmental standards. 
Our site visits to 45 supplier facilities across seven countries allowed our research team to 
look for discrepancies between audit reports and on-the-ground conditions in factories.  We 
uncovered a small number of cases where facility practices differed from the most recent audit 
reports, including auditing to looser working hours regulations in two Southeast Asia plants and 
persistent disciplinary wage deductions in a Czech plant.  Aside from these findings, the 
practices observed matched HP’s audit reports. We also used audit reports to examine variation 
between audit items across national settings.  Although the specific regulatory standards 
surrounding work hours and wages vary across countries, auditing techniques were highly similar 
across countries.  Detailed analyses of both within-audit and cross-national variation are 
available in the online appendix. 
HP’s use of third party auditors provides another opportunity for audit validation.  HP 
periodically employs professional third-party auditors in response to allegations of major 
problems at suppliers and also to validate their own internal auditing procedures.  Audits by 
third-parties account for approximately 9% of all audits in our data. We compared third-party 
audit findings against those of HP’s internal auditors in Table 1.  There were 29 facilities 
audited by both HP and third-party auditors. We find no major differences in their assessment of 
these facilities’ labor compliance. When examining Health and Safety, HP auditors assigned 
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lower scores than the third-party auditors.  However, the third-party auditors assigned 
marginally lower scores for environmental compliance. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
 
HP shared over five hundred original social and environmental responsibility audits 
conducted between June 2004 and January 2009.  Due to format changes starting in 2005, we 
exclude 2004 audits from our analyses, for a total of 484 audit reports covering 261 production 
facilities in fourteen countries. These audit reports cover roughly 22% of HP’s total of 1,200 
production locations (Hewlett-Packard 2011).   
A majority of supplier facilities comply with the code in thirteen of twenty key categories.vi 
Auditors found high compliance in freely chosen employment (87% compliant), freedom of 
association (87%), pollution control (87%), and air emissions (90%). At the other extreme are 
working hours (29% compliant), emergency preparedness (30%), and the management of 
hazardous substances (32%).  In addition, 42% of audited facilities were noncompliant in wages 
and benefits, arguably the most important standard to workers. vii  These high rates of 
noncompliance mitigate concerns that suppliers are successfully manipulating information to 
deceive auditors.  They also show that the supply chain is far from fully compliant with the 
EICC code, a finding affirmed by HP in its own corporate citizenship report (Hewlett Packard 
2011).   
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Improvements in Workplace Practices 
Despite the failure to achieve full compliance, working conditions have apparently improved 
during HP’s engagement with its suppliers.  Large and statistically significant improvements 
were observed in 12 of 20 audit items, including nearly all elements of the health and safety audit 
(Table 2).  Without an unaudited reference group, we have no control group against which to 
compare these improvements.  However, it is clear that suppliers improved their social 
compliance during the period we study. 
At the same time, key areas of social performance remained unchanged after repeated audits.  
Working hours improved only marginally to 30% compliance.  Wage practices showed no 
improvement at all.  Even for improving audit items, the resulting compliance levels were in 
some cases quite low.  While ergonomics compliance improved by 19 percentage points, only 
46% of facilities were compliant with this provision as of the most recent audit HP shared with us.  
This finding is consistent with previous research showing that, notwithstanding gradual 
improvements, auditing regimes show uneven performance and buyers appear to be willing to 
source from noncompliant factories (Ruwanpura and Wrigley 2011, Locke 2013). 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
Our examination of audit results also uncovered large variation from country to country.  
For example, industrial hygiene among Mexican suppliers improved from 44% to 100% 
compliance in repeated audits, but among Chinese suppliers compliance actually declined from 
28% to 25%.  This variation, combined with our fieldwork in electronics suppliers across seven 
countries, led us to more closely examine the variation across national settings of production.  
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Ideally, we would quantitatively analyze compliance and improvement in each country in our 
dataset, but small numbers of factories in many countries render such analysis impractical.  
Instead, we break countries into three groups that vary in economic development and two key 
domestic institutions we believe influence the efficacy of private regulation: regulatory 
authorities and civil society freedoms. Effective state regulatory institutions increase the threat of 
sanction against suppliers when private auditing uncovers workpalce violations.  When legal 
violations become known to local regulatory authorities, noncompliant suppliers may be subject 
to fines or other administrative penalties.  The more powerful these institutions, the more 
powerful the incentive to remediate violations identified by private auditors.  Civil society 
freedoms allow for the emergence of labor-friendly organizations that can play the roles of 
whistleblowers and worker advocates.  We explore the interaction between civil society 
organizations and private regulation in greater qualitative detail in the final section of this article. 
Our three country-groupings are presented in Table 3.  The left-hand side identifies 
groups and how many factories are located in each country.  The countries are sorted by per 
capita GDP, adjusted for purchasing power parity, according to the International Monetary Fund.  
We also display World Bank classifications of Higher, Upper-Middle and Lower-Middle income 
countries.  To indicate the quality of regulatory institutions, we present measures from the 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009).  
“Government Effectiveness” measures the quality of public bureuacracy and policy 
implementation, whereas “Rule of Law” focuses on contract enforcement, policing, and courts.  
Together, they provide information about the extent to which laws are implemented fairly across 
these countries.  We adopt this focus on implementation to acknowledge that there may be a 
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wide gap between the legal regulations on the books and their implementation in actual 
workplaces (Caraway 2009).viii   
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
To characterize civil society freedoms, we present measures from both WGI and Freedom 
House’s annual “Freedom in the World” report. “Voice and Accountability” includes a variety of 
freedoms, including democratic government, free media, and the ability to freely form 
associations.  The Freedom House measure for “Associational and Organizational Rights” is 
more narrowly focused on the freedom to demonstrate, form non-governmental organizations, 
and organize trade unions.ix 
These groups also have relatively consistent regional features.  The high-income group 
includes European Union countries and the two wealthiest Asian economies; the developing 
countries are in Southeast Asia and Latin America; and China occupies its own category. While 
Hungary has a similar income level to Brazil, it remains classified with its regional neighbors the 
Czech Republic and Poland becauase of the strength of its regulatory institutions. Singapore is 
classified in the high-income group with other wealthy countries with strong regulatory 
institutions, notwithstanding its weak civil society freedoms. 
The bottom of Table 3 reports the averages for each group and highlights their variation 
in regulatory institutions and civil society freedoms, and the distinctive features of each group are 
also presented in Table 4. The High-income countries exhibit more effective policy 
implementation and legal enforcement. On average, they also exhibit greater democratic 
freedoms, which allow for the presence of civil society organizations and labor organizations. 
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The Developing countries are significantly less wealthy with weaker policy implementation and 
legal development.  They also have a more uneven landscape of associational freedoms.  China 
is comparable to the Developing countries in regulatory institutions, but it shows much weaker 
civil society freedoms, with the lowest ratings in freedom of association and voice and 
accountability.   
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
Compliance in initial audits is generally highest in the high-income factories, lower in 
developing countries, and lowest in China.  If the auditing program imposes a floor on labor 
conditions, we expect to see convergence among the three groups and larger improvement among 
low-performers in the initial audit.  Instead, we see different behavior between the China-based 
factories and the factories located in other developing countries.  The developing country pool 
improves by 16 percentage points in labor compliance, 25 in health and safety, and 22 in 
environment.  In contrast, China improves by just 6 percentage points in labor, 14 in health and 
safety, and 6 in environment.  Factories in the developing country factories closed much of the 
compliance gap with those in high-income countries, but the Chinese plants did not.  Detailed 
compliance levels by country-group are reported in the online appendix. 
Divergent patterns of improvement between factories in China and in other developing 
countries are also evident on an item-by-item basis.  Figure 1 displays improvement estimates 
(and confidence intervals) between first and the most recent audits HP shared with us for each 
item of the labor audit.  The developing country pool shows improvement on nearly every item, 
including inhumane treatment and child labor. In contrast, we only detect significant 
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improvement among Chinese plants in non-discrimination and freedom of association. The data 
do not allow us to reject the hypothesis that these improvement effects are identical; we can only 
say that we find strong evidence of improvement among the developing country plants and more 
equivocal findings among the China plants.  It is important to note that while developing 
country suppliers improve more than those in high-income countries, their initial levels of 
compliance were lower and their scores on the last audits HP shared with us are almost identical 
to that in the high-income countries.  In hours and wages, a persistent problem area in China 
(Kortelainen 2008), Chinese factories showed no improvement. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
 
As we noted above, HP’s audits are not randomly assigned to factories. Could this selection 
process in some way bias our findings?  We noted above that HP prioritized high-risk factories 
for audits, which predicts that high-risk (low compliance) factories will be overrepresented in the 
sample.  Yet our analysis deals exclusively with suppliers selected to receive more than one 
audit, and for each of these plants we examine only their initial and final audits.  In other words, 
among suppliers audited multiple times, all are equally represented in these data.  (This applies 
to the regression analysis in the following section as well.).  This means that our analysis has 
little to say about plants that were rated low-risk facilities and only audited once, but it is 
precisely the facilities at highest risk of labor violations that are of greatest substantive interest in 
the study of private regulation. 
These differences between country-groups are consistent with our hypothesis that 
domestic institutions can enhance or hinder the efficacy of private regulation.  However, 
variation in national institutions is also confounded by systematic differences in the types of 
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factories in these countries and their relationships to HP.  In the following section, we test these 
alternative hypotheses about the determinants of regulatory compliance. 
 
Institutional versus factory-level explanations 
Based on our initial analysis of compliance and improvement trends, we hypothesize that the 
domestic institutional context is an important determinant of the efficacy of private regulation. 
We posit that compliance with social standards is primarily explained by the local institutional 
environment, rather than factory-level predictors. In nearly every country hosting global supply 
chains, national governments have passed strong laws that regulate the conditions of employment 
and protect the rights of workers. However, in many of these countries, these labor laws are often 
violated and the labor inspectorates charged with inspecting factories and enforcing the laws are 
weak, underfunded, and at times corrupt. To redress these problems, a number of countries have 
invested in innovative government programs and promoted new forms of more “responsive” 
regulation. In some countries, this innovation in regulation is promoted by and even co-produced 
by groups in civil society (Amengual 2010, 2014; Coslovsky 2011; Pires 2011). According to 
Michael Piore and Andrew Schrank (2008), a “regulatory renaissance” is underway in a host of 
developing countries. As a result of this renewed investment in labor regulation and the apparent 
role of civil society, we would expect that compliance outcomes would positively correlate with 
the strength of these domestic institutions.   Specifically, we hypothesize two mechanisms 
linking the domestic institutional environment to improved compliance.  First, information 
gathered by HP auditors may trigger greater improvement in the presence of strong local 
regulatory authorities, as the sanctions for noncompliance are higher in these settings.  Second, 
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civil society institutions may enable improvements by providing representation of worker 
interests and engaging in joint problem solving surrounding issues raised by private auditors.  
We operationalize these institutional dimensions by dividing factories into the three 
country groups described in Table 3.  The high-income countries have strong regulatory 
institutions and civil society freedoms.  The developing country group has weak regulatory 
institutions but relatively strong civil society freedoms.  Finally, China occupies its own group 
characterized by weak regulatory power and weak civil society.  Our theory predicts that both 
the high-income and the developing countries will exhibit higher levels of compliance than 
Chinese plants.  Because the measures of domestic institutions are highly aggregated, we leave 
the detailed exploration of mechanisms to the case study evidence in the final empirical section 
of the paper. 
H1. Domestic institutions. Stronger regulatory and civil society institutions predict improved 
factory outcomes under private regulation. 
However, previous research on globalization and transnational governance has generated 
several alternative hypotheses to explain varying success of private regulatory efforts. These 
alternative explanations are not exclusive, and thus our research does not adjudicate between 
conflicting theories. Instead, we examine whether any of the factors below can account for the 
regional patterns of workplace compliance and improvement we identified above. 
 
Intensity and style of private interventions 
One important confounder is variation in HP’s engagement with factories surrounding 
compliance issues.  Compliance may be explained in part by the intensity of HP’s auditing 
engagement, measured by total number of audits of the facility.  Alternatively, it may be 
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explained by “commitment”-based efforts to help suppliers through capability-building programs 
(Locke, Amengual & Mangla 2009).   
H2a. Auditing. Suppliers that receive more audits will show greater workplace improvement. 
H2b. Capability-building. Suppliers that participate in management or technical training 
programs will show greater workplace improvement. 
Power in global value chains 
Research on global value chains emphasizes differing power relations among actors in supply 
chains (Gereffi et al 2005). Under certain conditions—when transactions take place through 
competitive markets or suppliers depend upon few customers—buyers have power over their 
suppliers and thus can dictate the terms of contracts. On the other hand, where suppliers have 
capabilities that cannot be easily replicated by competitors, they retain more power vis-à-vis their 
global buyers.  Applying the global value chain literature to private monitoring schemes, we 
expect higher compliance with buyer demands in buyer-driven value chains, especially among 
suppliers producing commodity goods. Conversely, if suppliers produce unique or specialized 
products or components, we expect that they would exercise greater power vis-à-vis their buyers 
and thus be more resistant to buyer demands.x We operationalize supply chain power in two 
ways: supplier production of high value-added goods and how much HP spends at the supplier.xi   
H3a. High value-added production. Suppliers manufacturing high value-added (i.e. less 
commoditized) goods will enjoy greater bargaining power and therefore be more resistant to 
HP’s demands for workplace improvement. 
H3b. Buyer spend. HP’s top suppliers (by spend) enjoy more secure business relationships 
and therefore have increased ability to resist demands for social compliance. 
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Supplier Corporate Social Responsibility 
Many members of the global electronics supply chain are themselves large multinational firms. In 
recent years some have shown increased commitment to social responsibility (CSR) goals 
through establishing CSR departments and publishing reports on their activities. Whether or not 
these activities go beyond superficial public relations work, public commitments to CSR goals 
increase reputation risks for firms, and reputational concerns can influence workplace governance.  
Recent research on global supply chains suggests that reputation-conscious buyers drive 
improved working conditions among their suppliers (Oka 2009).  Similarly, suppliers that make 
public commitments to CSR goals may show greater compliance with buyer standards. 
H4. Supplier CSR commitments. Suppliers that make public commitments to social 
responsibility will show greater improvement. 
We investigate these hypotheses by operationalizing the factors described above and 
estimating regression models for factory compliance levels.  The outcome variable is the 
percentage of audit items in the labor, health, and environment sections that were compliant in 
each facility’s most recent (last shared by HP) audit.  Auditing intensity is operationalized using 
the total number of audits received by the factory, ranging from two to six.  We measure 
exposure to managerial training with an indicator showing whether the factory participated in the 
first round of the Focused Improvement Supplier Initiative program in China. In our data, 24 
suppliers sent at least one manager to receive forty days of managerial training on root cause 
analysis, overtime management, communication skills, environmental compliance, and other 
skills intended to improve compliance with the HP code.  This measure captures a particular 
version of capability-building that relies on off-site managerial training, rather than directly 
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engaging suppliers on the factory floor (Sako 2004, Distelhorst, Hainmueller, and Locke 2014), 
and focused entirely on China, where code violations were most prevalent. 
Strategic importance to HP is operationalized with a binary indicator of whether the factory 
was listed among HP’s top 100 suppliers by procurement expenditures (67% were).  We also 
worked with HP managers to sort supplier products into commodities (low value-added) and 
non-commodities (higher value-added); 64% of factories were engaged in high value-added 
production.  Finally, we measure supplier commitment to social responsibility by indicating 
whether their websites included a Corporate Social Responsibility report (23% did).  Summary 
statistics for all variables are reported in the online appendix. 
We also control for two potentially confounding factors related to time.  One concern is that 
variation across factories may reflect differences in when audits were conducted.xii  Our model 
therefore includes year fixed-effects to flexibly model variation over time.  Additionally, 
electronics production is characterized by seasonal fluctuations in demand, with higher orders to 
suppliers in preparation for the back-to-school and holiday seasons.  The production pressures 
of high-orders may induce more workplace violations; a dummy indicates whether the audit was 
conducted during this high-demand period from June to November. 
Results 
We find that regional variation in compliance is robust to controlling for all factory-level 
characteristics described above. Table 5 reports the results of OLS regression and shows that the 
inclusion of factory-level covariates does not appreciably change the magnitude or statistical 
significance of the regional differences we observe.  Consistent with H1, both developing and 
high-income countries out-perform Chinese plants in every section of the social audit.  
High-income countries enjoy stonger regulatory capacity and more robust civil society, and 
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therefore their performance is unsurprising.  What is more striking is the large gap between 
developing countries and China.  Labor compliance among factories in our developing country 
pool is 26-30 percentage points higher than the China plants.  The difference is 29-31 
percentage points in health and safety and 13-16 percentage points in environment.  The 
developing countries are slightly richer, but they have comparable quality of regulatory 
institutions to China.  A key difference between these two groups is the average strength of 
associational rights and civil society organizations.  We explore the role that these organizations 
play in private regulation in the following section. 
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
The analysis also reveals differences between the developing and high-income groups, which 
differ in economic development and the quality of their regulatory institutions.  Factories in the 
high-income countries are estimated to score 10 (column 1) or 14 (column 2) percentage points 
higher in labor compliance than those in the developing countries, differences with p-values of 
0.03 and 0.02 respectively.  However, these differences are markedly smaller than those 
observed between China and the rest of the factory pool.  We find no difference between 
developing and high-income countries in health and safety or environmental compliance. 
After controlling for regional effects, we find no evidence to support the other hypothesized 
drivers of effective private regulation listed above.  The only marginally statistically significant 
estimate is a negative correlation with increased auditing, consistent with HP’s claim that they 
audit high-risk plants more often.  However, even this effect is imprecisely estimated and 
appears in only one model.  We find no effect for being either a high-value added supplier or 
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one of HP’s Top 100 suppliers; this is consistent with the observation of high levels of 
modularity and low asset specificity in electronics manufacturing (Sturgeon 2002).  When 
interpreting the results for capability building, it should be noted that we study just one program 
that relied on off-site managerial training.  There are more intensive versions of capability 
building, such as Nike’s diffusion of lean manufacturingt techniques among footwear and apparel 
suppliers (Distelhorst, Hainmueller, and Locke 2014), that may yield different results.  We 
noted above that there are small deviations in audit scores between third-party and HP auditors.  
We re-estimated these model with an indicator of whether the audit was conducted by a 
third-party, and found no change in the main effects. 
To summarize our quantitative results, we observe divergent patterns in the improvement and 
final compliance levels of factories across different types of countries.  Stark differences across 
institutional contexts persist after controlling for key factory-level characteristics. In fact, none of 
the factory-level characteristics are significant predictors of compliance after controlling for 
regional factors. These results support our hypothesis that local institutional features play an 
important role in the efficacy of private regulatory programs.   
These findings are consistent with scholarship skeptical of the ability of private regulatory 
efforts to induce improvement in labor standards. These studies point to problems in the auditing 
process (O’Rourke 2002), weak punitive measures (Esbenshade 2004), and separation of 
purchasing decisions from monitoring functions within global buyers’ organizations (Locke, 
Amengual & Mangla 2009). This literature suggests that the particular qualities of the monitoring 
system or firms have little effect on workplace outcomes. Instead, working conditions will be 
driven by the traditional determinants of labor and environmental practices: domestic government 
institutions (Reich 2007; Piore 2005; Schrank 2009).   
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However, in contrast to claims that private regulation is rendered irrelevant by domestic 
instittuions, we contend that private regulation interacts with domestic institutions in ways that 
can be complementary or counterproductive.  Our quantitative results show that compliance and 
improvement are strongly predicted by the national context of production.   The following 
section shows how private regulation interacts with local institutions to produce these divergent 
outcomes. Private regulation can increase the power of existing regulatory institutions by 
drawing attention to violations and incentivizing management to address them to avoid state 
regulatory sanctions. Private regulation can also combine with independent civil society actors to 
offer alternative institutions of labor governance that substitute for weak government institutions.  
However, in the absence of both effective regulatory institutions and independent civil society, as 
in China, the efficacy of private regulation is severely limited.   
 
Domestic institutions and regulatory impact 
 
Our quantitative analysis of national context drew attention to two institutions hypothesized 
to enhance the efficacy of private regulation: state regulatory authorities and civil society 
freedoms.  The constructive interaction between regulatory institutions and private regulation is 
relatively straightforward; in the presence of the threat of fines or other disciplinary action by 
regulatory authorities, suppliers have greater incentive to respond to violations identified by 
private auditors, lest they become targets of these sanctions.  In the Czech Republic, for 
example, information gathered by HP auditors combined with growing stringency in the 
regulation of workplace standards to improve conditions for vulnerable agency workers.   A 
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similar combination of increasing state regulation and information gathered and shared by private 
auditors drove improvements in environmental standards as well (Locke, Pal, and Rissing 2013).  
In contrast, poorly institutionalized settings lack the threat of state enforcement when auditors 
discover violations.  This was particularly evident in the study of work hours in Chinese 
suppliers.  On paper, Chinese employment law includes stringent protections for workers, 
including a 36 hour monthly limit on overtime.  However, local regulators are aware that 
enforcing these and other regulations may adversely affect local industry.  Overtime hours are a 
motivator for low-wage employees in China, and the ability to adjust employee overtime 
according to variation in demand provides plants with production flexibility without massive 
hirings and firings of workers.  Managers in China interviewed during field visits described 
local labor bureaus concerned about employment figures and customer orders, in some cases 
facilitating worker recruitment and offering assurances that national work hours laws would not 
be enforced until nearly triple the legal limit.xiii  The disconnect between private standards, 
which demand adherence to local law, and the priorities of local regulatory agencies gave these 
factories little incentive to comply with private regulatory demands. 
It is therefore unsurprising to see greater compliance and improvement among HP suppliers 
in high-income countries that possess strong regulatory institutions.  However, even in the 
absence of effective regulatory institutions, we find significant divergence in workplace 
outcomes between China and other developing countries that offer more robust civic freedoms.  
We use qualitative fieldwork in Mexico and China to illustrate how civil society can productively 
interact with private regulatory regimes.xiv   
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Transnational pressure and local civil society 
 
Mexico and China are geographically large, populous, and classified by the World Bank as  
“upper-middle income” countries.  They exhibit similar strength of regulatory institutions, but 
they diverge in civil society freedoms (Table 3).  In Mexico, civil society is diverse and the right 
to form non-governmental organizations is generally respected (although trade unions have been 
subject to state and employer interference).  In contrast, Chinese civil society is subject to strict 
regulations, driving many to register as businesses or remain informal (Hildebrandt 2011).  
Workers seeking to organize outside of the official state-run union face not only dismissal but 
also harassment or imprisonment (Lee 2009).xv Field research illustrates how these differences in 
civil society led to different compliance outcomes. 
 
Transnational Pressure and Independent Civil Society in Mexicoxvi  
Electronics factories in Guadalajara, Mexico struggled with poor conditions surrounding 
agency workers in the mid-2000s.  These included discriminatory hiring practices, in which 
workers were subjected to pre-hiring pregnancy screening, and repeated hiring and firing on 
short-term contracts to limit eligibility for benefits.   
HP’s auditors identified these issues and put pressure on suppliers to improve.  In response, 
electronics employers partnered with a local civil society organization (CEREAL) to create a 
collaborative dispute resolution institution.  When workers registered complaints with local 
courts and they also reported them to CEREAL, this local NGO initiated consultations with the 
employer.  If the NGO and employer both determined that the complaint did not violate 
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Mexican labor law or the EICC code of conduct, CEREAL would advise the worker to return to 
work.  If the complaint was verified, the employer would compensate workers according to 
Mexican law.  When disputes could not be resolved by consultation between CEREAL and the 
employer, they would be escalated to either the electronics industry association or the local 
courts.  
CEREAL addressed over 4,000 worker claims in this manner, primarily related to the unfair 
dismissal of workers (Peterson 2010), and suppliers showed significant improvement in treatment 
of agency workers.  By 2009, none of HP’s Mexican suppliers were found in violation of the 
code's stipulations concerning the treatment of agency workers.  This system offered a substitute 
for inefficient state institutions of dispute resolution.  Legal resolution via courts required one to 
three years, wherease mediations through CEREAL took just one to three months.   
 
Transnational Pressure and “Unionization” in China 
A very different pattern emerged in China.  Electronics suppliers in China were plagued by 
problems in work hours, emergency preparedness, safeguarding of hazardous materials, industrial 
hygiene, and, crucially, worker pay.  Suppliers exacted disciplinary fines for worker mistakes, 
manipulated overtime calculations to reduce pay, and mandated worker participation in unpaid 
training sessions.   
In response to HP pressure to improve working conditions, some suppliers in China 
established organizations to represent worker interests and improve communications with 
management.  Limits on independent civil society in China meant that independent unions or 
labor-friendly NGOs like CEREAL were not readily available to play this role.  Instead, 
suppliers established branches of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).  In the 
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2000s, the ACFTU expanded its membership in the private sector and among migrant workers, 
with national membership growing from 87 million in 1999 to 212 million in 2008 (Liu 2010).  
Although the ACFTU describes itself as “a representative of the interests of members and 
workers,”xvii its power comes primarily from its administrative status in the state rather than 
grassroots mobilization of its members (Chen 2009).  This has permitted the ACFTU to play an 
important role in legislative advocacy (Chen 2009) and in some cases labor relations (Liu 2010), 
but field research found that labor standards violations persisted after the establishment of these 
unions in Chinese suppliers. 
To understand why unionization in China failed to complement private regulation, it is 
instructive to examine a typical case.  Supplier Gamma (a pseudonuym) manufactured 
networking and wireless equipment in Shenzhen, employing roughly two thousand workers in 
surface-mount technology, hand assembly, and quality control processes.  At the time of field 
research in 2009, operators received the local minimum wage of 900 RMB per month.  When 
HP first audited Gamma in 2007, auditors found noncompliance with many labor standards.  
Workers were subject to wage deductions for violations of company rules.  The factory failed to 
prevent youth workers of 16 to 18 years from working in hazardous tasks, which they are legally 
forbidden to perform.  The factory also failed to train workers on their rights under the 
Electronics Industry Code of Conduct.  In total, this initial audit found eight major violations 
and 33 minor violations of the EICC code.  
The initial audit also documented the absence of a labor union, and Gamma responded by 
establishing its own branch of the ACFTU.  However, when HP auditors returned the following 
year, they found that labor standards had, if anything, deteriorated since the establishment of the 
union.  While wage deductions had been eliminated, the factory was found to be underpaying 
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workers for overtime.  A second follow-up audit found that this underpayment had persisted, 
and in addition management was failing to pay workers for mandatory after-hours trainings.  
Youth workers continued to be engaged in hazardous tasks, night shifts, and excessive overtime 
work.  
Whereas civil society in Mexico mediated labor disputes, Gamma’s union failed to improve 
communications between workers and management.  One year after the union was established, 
only 3 of 16 workers interviewed by HP auditors were even aware that the union existed.  
Although the factory had placed suggestion boxes in the factory, no worker feedback had been 
collected from them, and workers had little awareness of the labor standards established by the 
EICC.  HP’s auditors wrote: “the effectiveness of…communication channels were not obvious, 
such as labor union meeting was very few, no suggestion was collected from suggestion box in 
past half year, no worker visited the consultation team.” 
The union’s failure to improve communication and resolve important workplace issues is in 
part related to its structure.  Only 6% of the workforce had joined Gamma’s union one year after 
its establishment.  Auditors also noted that the union was underfunded and chaired by a Gamma 
human resource manager, a typical arrangement for unions in Chinese electronics.  Our field 
researcher visited a total of thirteen electronics plants in China; six of their nine labor unions 
were chaired by management.  One union chair knew nothing of factory labor disputes (there 
had been four within the last year), and another only visited worker dormitories for the first time 
during our research visit.  
Unions in HP suppliers in China were weak advocates for worker interests, but alternative 
civil society partners were difficult to find.  Strictures on independent civil society limit the 
scope of activity among China’s independent labor organizations (Fu 2015), which tend to 
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individualize and institutionalize labor conflict rather than represent the collective interests of 
workers (Friedman and Lee 2010).  HP did seek civil society partners beyond the official union, 
engaging with Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misconduct (SACOM) and two other 
Hong Kong-based groups to deliver trainings to several thousand workers across two supplier 
factories in Dongguan, China.  These NGOs proposed a worker hotline to gather grievances and 
initiate dialogue with factory management, a project with some similarity to the collaboration 
with CEREAL in Mexico.  However, one of the two suppliers refused to participate in the 
hotline, opting to maintain its internal grievance resolution procedures instead.  The hotline that 
was established resulted in factory improvements surrounding resignation policy and dormitory 
conditions, yet it served just a single factory for a ten-month period (SACOM 2009, Chan 2012).  
In the absence of credible civil society partners, private substitutes for lax state enforcement of 
labor laws did not emerge in China. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
Our investigation of HP’s efforts to regulate social and environmental standards among its 
global suppliers reveals both the possibilities and limits of private voluntary regulation. 
Examination of audit results showed improvements in the working conditions of suppliers 
worldwide. Even so, private regulation did not equalize working conditions across suppliers. 
While suppliers improved during HP’s engagement, neither more frequent auditing nor the 
capability building program we examined generated greater compliance.  
The most significant finding of our research is the continuing salience of local institutions in 
determining labor standards improvements.  Analysis of audit data showed that factories in 
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countries with weak regulatory institutions but decent civil society freedoms dramatically 
outperformed factories in China, which had comparable regulatory institutions but an anemic 
civil society.  While these findings are consistent with improvements due purely to the quality 
of local institutions, interviews and factory visits highlighted how these institutions interacted 
with HP’s private regulatory scheme.  This suggests that private compliance programs, far from 
substituting for or undermining public regulation (Seidman 2007), depend upon well-functioning 
national institutions and regulations to be effective. In this sense, public and private regulatory 
regimes may act more as complements than rivals.  In the Czech Republic, HP’s private 
regulation was aided by the threat of enforcement by state regulators, producing a complementary 
relationship between private and public.  More provocatively, in settings with poorer 
enforcement capabilities, such as Mexico, local civil society can mobilize resources to address 
problems identified through transnational private regulation.  In contrast, where both regulatory 
enforcement and local civil society are weak, private regulation lacks these outside resources to 
incentivize and support improvements.  This was evident from our field research in China, the 
world’s largest production site for global electronics. 
There are several limitations to keep in mind when interpreting these findings.  These 
complementarities between local institutions and transnational private regulation are unlikely to 
be exhaustive.  In addition to worker advocacy NGOs, freedom of press may be another 
dimension of civil society development that aids private regulation by publicizing scandalous 
working conditions (Toffel, Short, and Ouellet 2014).  Moreover, our findings come from global 
electronics production and rely heavily on results from mainland China, Eastern Europe, and 
Mexico. When applying these insights to other industries and institutional environments, we 
recommend beginning with a careful comparison of the local regulatory and civil society settings.  
31 
Production Goes Global, Compliance Stays Local 
 
 
Another feature that merits future attention is the quality of buyer-supplier relations; private 
regulation in the absence of complementary institutions may be more effective under conditions 
of increased trust between buyers and suppliers.  Our study also focused on first-tier, high-risk 
suppliers; the effects of private regulation on “upstream” suppliers or low-risk workplaces await 
future research.  Finally, our conclusions are limited by the inability to disaggregate economic 
and institutional characteristics by country (with the exception of China) as well as the absence of 
longitudinal data that would establish baseline labor conditions prior to the introduction of the HP 
program. 
While China is a laggard in workplace compliance during the period we study, subsequent 
policy changes may have improved factory labor standards.  In 2008, China implemented new 
national laws on labor contracts and labor disputes, which appear to have curtailed trends toward 
informalization in urban labor markets (Gallagher et al 2015).  In addition to these institutional 
changes, labor shortages have increased manufacturing wages in the coastal provinces that 
dominate exports in China.  Future comparative research might examine the extent to which 
these trends have closed the gap in labor standards between electronics firms in China and other 
emerging markets. 
Despite these limitations, it is important not to under-generalize from this research.  As a 
mature approach to supply chain compliance, HP’s supplier responsibility system is an especially 
likely case to observe effective transnational private regulation in action.  Our findings of 
limited improvement and the importance of local context over repeated audits or 
capability-building programs suggests that even under favorable conditions, private regulation 
requires complementarity with local institutions to be most effective.  While our case studies 
focus on two particular countries, many in the developing country group have similarly vibrant 
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civil societies to Mexico and may therefore develop similarly productive interactions between 
transnational pressures and local civil society.  
The complementarities we highlight between private regulation and local institutions offer a 
helpful theoretical lens for exploring the uneven success of private regulatory regimes across 
countries.  Future research may refine our understanding of the necessary conditions for civil 
society groups to have the beneficial impact documented here, including the potential for any 
such organizations to emerge in unfavorable political terrain, like China.  Future studies may 
also shed light on how subnational variation in local institutions drives differences in private 
regulatory efficacy; our mechanism predicts that stronger local institutions will enhance private 
regulatory efficacy.  
This study illustrates how the success of transnational private regulation—and the pathways it 
takes to success—turn upon the economic, political, and social institutions where production 
occurs.  Even as electronics manufacturing stretches across national borders, folding the work of 
many countries into a single product, workplace conditions remain tied to the domestic 
institutional endowments of their nation-states. How best to enhance these institutional 
endowments and the role that private voluntary initiatives may play in this process remain a 
central concern for promoting a more just global economy.xviii  
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Figure 1. Labor compliance improvement by country group 
 
 
Notes.  Estimated improvement for each item in the labor audit (by country group).  Reports 
the estimated difference in compliance between the initial and final audits.  Black lines show 95% 
confidence intervals from a two-tailed t-test with unequal variances.  There are 77 factories in 
China, 34 in the Developing group, and 26 in the High-income group. 
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Table 1: Compliance levels assessed by HP auditors and third-party auditors 
Section 
Compliance level,  
HP auditors (se)  
Compliance level, 
third-party auditors (se) 
Difference 
p-value 
Labor 56% (4) 51% (5) .44 
Health & Safety 44% (4) 55% (4) .07 
Environment 69% (3) 60% (4) .14 
Total audits 40 32  
Notes. Compares audit scores from 29 facilities audited by both HP’s internal auditors and 
third-party auditors since 2006, with standard errors in parentheses.  “Compliance” presents the 
percentage of audit items rated compliant (i.e. neither major nor minor violations).  Reported 
p-values come from two-sided t-tests of unequal variances.   
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Table 2: Improvement summary for HP suppliers 
  Compliance in…    
Audit item Facilities first audit final audit Diff. se pval 
LABOR       
Non-discrimination 122 50% 75% +25 (6) .00 
Freedom of association 117 81% 95% +14 (4) .00 
Inhumane treatment 115 78% 90% +11 (5) .02 
Working hours 130 22% 30% +8 (5) .16 
Freely chosen employment 120 83% 88% +5 (5) .27 
Child labor 122 58% 63% +5 (6) .43 
Wages & benefits 126 57% 57% 0 (6) 1.00 
HEALTH & SAFETY       
Dorms & canteens 104 37% 61% +24 (7) .00 
Occupational health & safety 116 39% 58% +19 (6) .00 
Ergonomics 123 27% 46% +19 (6) .00 
Occupation injury procedures 118 53% 69% +17 (6) .01 
Machine safeguarding 121 66% 79% +13 (6) .02 
Emergency preparedness 130 20% 31% +11 (5) .05 
Industrial hygiene 133 40% 47% +8 (6) .22 
ENVIRONMENT       
Product content restrictions 119 50% 84% +34 (6) .00 
Pollution & resource reduction 100 79% 94% +15 (5) .00 
Hazardous substances 128 23% 37% +13 (6) .02 
Wastewater and solid waste 113 83% 85% +2 (5) .72 
Air emissions 112 90% 91% +1 (4) .82 
Env. permits & reporting 107 80% 74% -7 (6) .26 
Notes. Facilities are “compliant” when they had no major or minor non-conformances in a 
given audit item. Latest audit compliance rates differ from those in Table 3 because this table 
includes only facilities audited at least twice, when both audits were conducted between 2004 
and 2009. Observation counts vary because not all audit items are assessed in each audit. 
Standard errors and p-values from two-sided t-tests (unequal variance). 
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Table 3. Country groupings by economic and institutional characteristics  
 
 
  
Level of 
Economic 
Development 
Regulatory institutions Civil society 
 
 N 
Per 
capita 
GDP 
WB 
class. 
WGI:  
Govt. Eff. 
WGI:  
Rule of Law 
WGI:  
Voice & 
Accty 
FH: 
Association 
H
ig
h-
in
co
m
e Singapore 8 48.5 High 2.21 1.67 -0.21 3.25 
Taiwan 3 29.2 - 1.13 0.87 0.79 10.75 
Czech 10 23.4 High 0.96 0.85 0.96 12 
Poland 1 17.9 High 0.78 0.87 1.04 12 
Hungary 4 15.5 UpM 0.47 0.44 0.91 11.75 
D
ev
el
op
in
g 
Brazil 4 13.5 UpM 0.15 -0.52 0.16 9.25 
Malaysia 7 12.9 UpM 1.14 0.51 -0.41 5.75 
Mexico 9 9.3 UpM -0.11 -0.39 0.46 10 
Thailand 9 7.4 UpM 0.35 -0.04 -0.39 6 
Indonesia 2 3.5 LowM -0.33 -0.71 -0.13 8.75 
Philippines 3 3.3 LowM -0.04 -0.50 -0.06 8.5 
 China 77 5.1 UpM 0.07 -0.43 -1.6 2 
 Averages        
 High-income 26 30.6  1.3 0.9 0.6 9.2 
 Developing 34 9.8  0.3 -0.2 -0.1 7.7 
 China 77 5.1  0.1 -0.4 -1.6 2.0 
Notes. Country characteristics by groupings.  GDP and World Governance Indicators (WGI) are six-year 
averages over 2004-2009; Freedom House (FH) scores are four year averages over 2006-2009.  Group means 
are weighted by the number of factories in each country.  This table lists factories audited at least twice, 
which provide the basis for the analyses that follow.  GDP per capita based on purchasing-power-parity 
(PPP) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2013.  World Bank 
classification: lower-middle income, upper-middle income, high-income.  The World Bank does not classify 
Taiwan on this scale. 
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Table 4. Institutional features by country groups 
  Civil society freedoms 
  High Low 
Re
gu
la
to
ry
 
In
st
itu
tio
ns
 
High High-income  
Low Developing China 
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Table 5. Compliance scores, regions, and factory characteristics 
 
Labor Health and Safety Environment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Developing .30*** .26*** .29*** .31*** .16*** .13*** 
 
(.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.04) (.04) 
High-income .40*** .40*** .27*** .29*** .13** .12** 
 
(.04) (.04) (.07) (.07) (.05) (.05) 
(Reference region: China)     
Total audits 
 
-.05 
 
-.06* 
 
-.00 
  
(.03) 
 
(.04) 
 
(.03) 
Capability-building 
 
.04 
 
.11 
 
-.05 
  
(.08) 
 
(.08) 
 
(.07) 
High value-added 
 
-.01 
 
.00 
 
-.06 
  
(.05) 
 
(.05) 
 
(.04) 
Top 100 supplier 
 
.01 
 
.03 
 
.02 
  
(.05) 
 
(.06) 
 
(.04) 
Supplier CSR report 
 
.03 
 
.07 
 
.07 
  
(.06) 
 
(.06) 
 
(.05) 
High-season 
 
-.04 
 
-.00 
 
-.00 
  
(.04) 
 
(.05) 
 
(.04) 
Year fixed effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant .54*** .79*** .44*** .63*** .69*** .84*** 
 
(.03) (.10) (.03) (.12) (.03) (.09) 
Observations 137 134 137 134 137 134 
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Note that for three plants we had 
no data on high-value added production; they are dropped from the full models. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i Duhigg, Charles and David Barboza.  “THE iECONOMY: In China, Human Costs Are 
Built Into an iPad” The New York Times. Jan. 25, 2012. Page A1. 
ii These rankings are reported by revenue and published in Fortune Magazine. In 2011 HP 
reported revenues in excess of USD 127 billion. 
iii IDC Worldwide Quarterly PC Tracker, January 12, 2011.   
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS22653511 
iv The HP Code of Conduct can be accessed online: 
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/environment/pdf/supcode.pdf 
v Interviews with HP regional Social and Environmental Responsibility managers, 2008-2010. 
vi Detailed tables of compliance scores are available in the online appendix.  Our analysis 
focuses on the labor, health and safety, and environmental sections of the EICC Code, since 
these represent the most direct measurements of workplace conditions. Audit sections on 
general adoption of the Code, management systems, and ethics practices are not analyzed 
here. 
vii One possible reason wages and benefits compliance have stagnated has to do with 
increasing stringency in the audits. In China, auditors realized that many plants mandated 
employees arrive early or stay after hours for “trainings” without proper overtime 
compensation. These notes appear only in later audits, indicating that this received scrutiny 
only later in the audit process. To the auditors’ credit, they appear to be increasing pressure 
over time, in accordance the commitment to “raising standards” set forth in HP’s 2009 
Global Citizenship Report. 
viii Although the WGI indicator “Regulatory Quality” sounds more relevant, in fact it 
primarily measures the burden of government regulation on businesses, as opposed to the 
effective and fair implementation of government policy. 
ix See Freedom House report methodology for more detail: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology 
x Running contrary to the global value chain literature are theories drawn from the 
international political economy field suggesting that the cost pressures inherent to 
subcontracting relationships lead to a race-to-the-bottom in supplier labor rights (Mosley & 
Uno 2007; Mosley 2011).  This approach anticipates the opposite effect of commodity 
production; suppliers in more competitive (i.e. commoditized) markets should exhibit lower 
compliance with HP’s private regulatory standards as market pressures drive costs and labor 
standards downward.   
xi High value-added production may also involve high-skill jobs that naturally enjoy higher 
labor standards.  However, in our visits to electronics factories, we found large numbers of 
low-skill production operators in both low- and high-value added production.  Therefore, 
we do not expect variation in worker skill associated with high value-added production to 
confound our estimates here. 
xii Indeed, a locally weighted regression (lowess) of compliance scores over time, available in 
the online appendix, shows a roughly linear increase in audit scores over time. 
45 
Production Goes Global, Compliance Stays Local 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
xiii Interviews with supplier Human Resource Managers, 2009.  Note, however, that the 
differences between China and the developing countries are not entirely driven by China’s 
stringent work hours regulations. The effects estimated in Table 5 are robust to the exclusion 
of the work hours audit item from the analysis. 
xiv Researchers participating in this project visited 45 supplier facilities in China (13), the 
Czech Republic (9), Hungary (6), Mexico (7), Malaysia (1), Singapore (3), and Thailand (3). 
xv Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2012.”  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2012 
xvi The Mexico findings summarized here also appear in greater detail in Locke, Rissing, and 
Pal (2013). 
xvii ACFTU Website.  http://www.acftu.org/template/10001/file.jsp?cid=804&aid=42616  
Accessed April 23, 2014. 
xviii One innovative initiative is the International Labor Organiztion’s Better Work program, 
which combines monitoring with capability-building surrounding employee participation 
and worker-managmeent communication (Oka 2009).  
<<http://www.betterwork.org>> 
